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Abstract
How do countries respond to shocks from their major trading partners? This paper 
addresses the question in the context of the observed shifts in trade linkages between the 
Baltic countries and their major trading partners. Vector autoregression (VAR) models 
were used to examine the magnitude and sources of growth spillovers to the Baltics from 
key trading partners, as well as shocks from the real effective exchange rate (REER). 
Our results show there are significant cross-country spillovers to the Baltics, with spillo-
vers from the EU outweighing those from Russia. Shocks to the REER generally depress 
growth in the Baltics, and this effect rises over time. We also find that financial and trade 
linkages are the dominant transmission channels of spillovers to the region, which expla-
ins the current realization of downside risks to the Baltics from the global slowdown. In 
general, therefore, these results suggest that the Baltics are susceptible to shocks from 
their key trading partners. 
Keywords: spillovers, Baltics, vector autoregression, financial and trade linkages
1 Introduction
Given the historical and economic ties among the countries, Russia’s 1998 economic 
crisis had significant consequences for the Baltic States.1 The crisis, triggered by sharp 
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declines in oil and commodity prices and non-payment of taxes by major energy and 
manufacturing companies, affected the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
through financial and trade linkages. Specifically, Baltic banks that had invested heavily 
in Russia’s short-term treasury bills suffered significant losses following the country’s 
debt default. Interest rates also rose sharply in Baltic interbank markets. In addition, there 
were significant declines in Baltic exports to Russia because of the sharp depreciation of 
the Russian ruble. As a result, all three Baltic countries recorded precipitous declines in 
GDP growth rates. 
Since then, changes in trade linkages suggest some decoupling from the Russian eco-
nomy towards the EU countries. The Baltic countries’ trade with Russia has declined in the 
years since the crisis. Over the period 2000-07, exports of the Baltic countries to Russia 
have fallen, as a share of total exports, by nearly 8 percent while exports to the EU coun-
tries have grown by an average of about 10 percent. Similarly, Baltic imports from Russia 
have fallen by an average of 4¼ percent while imports from the EU have risen by over 6 
percent since the crisis. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Baltics is also increasingly 
tilted toward Europe with a significant share originating from Sweden, Finland, and De-
nmark. These shifts in economic linkages raise important questions concerning how the 
Baltic countries will respond to shocks from its major trading partners.
Against the backdrop of these shifting trade patterns, this paper analyses economic 
spillovers to the Baltic countries. We examine the relative effects of both external shocks 
in key trading partners and internal shocks captured by the real effective exchange rate on 
the Baltic economies. We will be building on two main papers, namely, Kanda (2007) and 
Swiston and Bayoumi (2008). While the former dealt with spillovers in Ireland, the latter 
looked at spillovers across NAFTA. One of the key contributions of this paper, therefore, 
is to measure the magnitude and sources of spillovers for the Baltic countries, given that 
the author does not know of any such endeavors in current literature. Although the ma-
gnitude of the effect is still contentious, the literature on spillovers and international bu-
siness cycles typically finds that countries with greater trade and financial linkages have 
more synchronized business cycles (see Imbs, 2004; Inklaar, Jong-a-pin and De Hann, 
2005; Herrero and Ruiz, 2007; Koopman and Azevedo, 2007). 
Some other studies have pointed to different types of spillovers from a given coun-
try to its trading partners. Coe et al. (2008) showed the impact of domestic and foreign 
investments in research and development (R&D) on total factor productivity and growth 
in trading partners. While trade linkages have been found to be important in influencing 
a country’s growth, spillover effects may also be transmitted through financial linkages 
with growing foreign direct and portfolio investments. Finally, there may be indirect ef-
fects, with business and consumer confidence in major trading partner countries influen-
cing confidence in another country (Arora and Vamvakidis, 2006).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 1998 Russian 
economic crisis and its effects on the Baltics. In section 3, we present some stylized facts 
on trade and financial linkages of the Baltics with their major trading partners. Section 4 
uses vector autoregression (VAR) models to assess the dynamics and severity of shocks 
in trading partners and their effects on competitiveness in the Baltic economies. Following 145
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Bayoumi and Swiston (2007), we estimate the contribution of spillovers from trade, fi-
nance and commodity prices in section 5. Section 6 contains an evaluation of how our 
model’s predictions fit actual responses of the Baltics to the global crisis while section 7 
concludes the paper with some policy implications. 
2 The 1998 Russian crisis
The consequences of cross-border spillovers on the Baltics were particularly visi-
ble during the Russian crisis. All three Baltic countries suffered precipitous declines in 
GDP growth during the crisis. Only Latvia did not fall into a recession during the period 
as both Estonia and Lithuania recorded negative growth rates from 1999:Q1 to 1999:Q3. 
The fall in growth seems to have been associated with reductions in the growth rates of 
investment and external demand. Investment fell more in Estonia and Latvia than in Li-
thuania. Lithuania’s growth was mostly affected by the fall in total exports given its re-
latively high export exposure2 to Russia. Remarkably, in all three Baltic countries, hou-
seholds appeared to smooth consumption, as consumption growth remained stable thro-
ughout the period.
The recovery of Russia’s output began in early 1999 and provided an impetus for 
economic activity in the Baltics. This was initially driven by import substitution due to 
substantial real depreciation of the ruble, and had a further adverse effect on the Baltics. 
However, the recovery later became more broadly based as domestic demand, including 
investment and private consumption, began to grow buoyantly. The Baltic countries res-
ponded to this rebound after two to three quarters with GDP growth rates turning positi-
ve by 2000:Q1 in all the countries. 
3 Trade and financial linkages
Direction of trade data indicates that Russia and the European Union are the main tra-
ding partners of the Baltic countries. In consequence, they are key determinants of eco-
nomic activity in the region. However, spillovers from these trading partners would not 
only affect one Baltic country directly but may also have significant indirect effects on 
the other Baltic countries given high intra-regional trade. Although Russia remains an im-
portant trading partner, there has been considerable reorienting of Baltic exports toward 
the EU (Table 1).3 
A comparison of export shares of the Baltic countries before and after the Russian 
crisis shows a significant decline in the share of exports to Russia and a simultaneous in-
crease in exports to the EU. Within the EU, Baltic trade is mostly concentrated in a small 
number of countries, with Finland, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the UK being the main 
trade partners. There has also been greater foreign direct investment from European co-
untries, especially since EU accession. 
2 Export exposure is calculated as the share of total exports to a given country as a percentage of GDP.
3 In Table 1, advanced EU consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK, while emerging EU comprises Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Portugal.146
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The dominance of foreign-owned banks in the Baltics has also reinforced linkages 
with the EU. Measured by share of banking sector assets a significant part of bank owner-
ship is vested in foreign banks. On average, over 80 percent of banking sector assets in 
the Baltics belong to foreign-owned banks. Given these linkages, the Baltic countries 
may have well synchronized business cycles with their major trading partners. Kose et 
al. (2003) argues that the similarity in these cycles could reflect the influence of common 
world business cycles or common global shocks. 
4 Econometric analysis
A combination of vector autoregression models was used to evaluate current growth 
spillovers in the Baltic countries. In particular, a four-variable vector autoregression model 
was estimated for each of the Baltic countries. Given the perceived effect of oil price 
growth in the Baltics vis-à-vis their economic linkages to Russia, these VAR models were 
extended to include the percentage change in oil prices. The analyses also decomposed 
the contributions of three potential channels of spillovers. All variables were seasonally 
adjusted and shown to be stationary using the Ng-Perron tests (Table A1).4 Data for the 
analyses spanned 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
4 This testing procedure was adopted because of its superiority in size and power over the more commonly-used 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. Especially in small samples, the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests tend 
to over-reject the null hypothesis when it is true and under-reject when it is false (see Dejong et al., 1992; and Harris 
and Sollis, 2003 for details). 
Table 1:   The Baltic countries: direction of exports to major trading partners
(in % of total)
1994-99 2000-07
Estonia
Advanced EU 51.2 58.5
Emerging EU 13.8 14.4
Russia 15.4   8.2
Latvia
Advanced EU 39.4 51.0
Emerging EU 21.1 24.0
Russia 18.1   9.0
Lithuania
Advanced EU 37.2 41.2
Emerging EU 19.5 24.2
Russia 19.8 11.8
Source: IMF DTTS and author’s calculations.147
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4.1 Vector autoregression models
Three vector autoregression models were estimated in order to evaluate the impact of 
spillovers to the Baltic countries. The VAR models were estimated with four lags for each 
variable.5 Following Cholesky decomposition, the variables in the VAR were ordered as 
follows: EU real GDP growth6, Russian real GDP growth, the Baltic country real GDP 
growth, and the unit labor cost (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER). In this 
regard, the ULC-based REER was preferred to the CPI-based REER because it is superi-
or in reflecting a country’s ability to sell its products in international markets and captu-
ring domestic cost considerations associated with tradable goods. The inclusion of own 
GDP shocks in the analysis is meant to capture autonomous demand shocks. For sensiti-
vity analysis, the ordering of the EU real GDP and Russian real GDP were reversed and 
the results were not significantly sensitive to this change. 
Variance decomposition results reveal that partner country shocks explain a substan-
tial amount of variations in Estonian and Lithuanian GDP growth but much less so in La-
tvia (Table A2) with the share of variation explained by Russian GDP being largest in Li-
thuania. This may be related to Lithuania’s high export exposure to Russia, and the stra-
tegic influence of Russia on Lithuania’s oil refinery. The share of variation attributable 
to Russia rises over time in all the Baltic countries. 
Shocks to competitiveness captured by the REER explain a substantial share of out-
put variation in Estonia and Latvia, particularly at longer horizons. However, over the 
same period, only about 7 percent of variation in Lithuanian GDP growth is attributa-
ble to REER. Given that much of Lithuania’s foreign trade is oil-related, and oil is a tra-
dable good, changes in Lithuania’s REER are not likely to cause significant changes in 
net exports and therefore, unlikely to account for a significant share of variation to the 
country’s GDP growth. In all three cases, however, the share of variation in GDP growth 
attributable to changes in REER takes some time to build up. This implies that shocks to 
the REER may have much stronger effects on growth in the Baltic countries over longer 
time horizons. 
The impulse response functions suggest that shocks from the EU exert significant ef-
fects on the growth rate of Baltic countries particularly in the first year (Figure A1). Im-
pulse responses were normalized to one percent shocks to simplify comparison across co-
untries. In all cases, there is a fairly significant contemporaneous increase in GDP growth 
rate for the Baltic country. In contrast to EU shocks, the effects of shocks from Russian 
GDP are not large. In all the Baltic countries except Lithuania, shocks from Russian GDP 
leave their GDP growth rate unaffected on impact. Lithuania’s GDP response to a one per-
cent shock from Russia occurs contemporaneously with growth of about ½ percent. 
5 Test results for Latvia and Lithuania indicated an optimal lag of two. However, we used four lags for each equ-
ation to allow for comparability. In addition to being the logical choice for quarterly data, this is also consistent with 
the specifications in Stock and Watson (2005), Perez et al. (2007), and Swiston and Bayoumi (2008).
6 The euro area real GDP we adopted consists of the combined real GDP of the fifteen member states of the EU 
prior to the accession of ten candidate countries in 2004. These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.148
K. I. Obiora: Do countries catch cold when trading partners sneeze? Evidence from spillovers in the Baltics
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (2) 143-160 (2010)
An appreciation of the REER generally depresses growth in all three Baltic countri-
es. In the context of increases in the REER, signifying appreciation of the exchange rate, 
and therefore, a loss of international competitiveness, shocks to the REER have adverse 
effects on the Baltics, with the effects in Estonia and Latvia lasting much longer than in 
Lithuania. An increase in the REER contemporaneously depresses GDP growth in Esto-
nia by about ¾ percent in the first quarter, deteriorates further to 1¼ percent and conti-
nues up to the fifth quarter. In Latvia, an innovation to the REER contemporaneously re-
duces growth by about ½ percent in the first quarter, and this effect lasts up to the four-
th quarter. These results coincide with those from variance decomposition and strongly 
suggest that the effect of an appreciation of the REER could persist for over one year in 
these countries. 
4.2 Extended vector autoregression models
The better to assess effects from Russia, we introduced oil price growth to the VAR. 
Changes in the price of oil may have opposite effects on the Baltics: increases in oil pri-
ces may have positive effects on these countries through stimulated growth in Russia but 
may also impose negative supply shocks on them. The inclusion of oil price growth in 
the VAR, therefore, attempts to isolate the effects of Russia from those of oil prices. Re-
sults from the variance decomposition and impulse response functions are presented in 
Table A3 and Figure A2. 
In terms of relative importance of shocks, growth in oil prices explains a significant 
share of variation in GDP growth for the Baltic countries. The inclusion of oil price growth 
in the base VAR also led to significantly higher share of variation in Baltic GDP growth 
attributable to Russia. In the base VAR, Russia accounted for an average of 9.1 percent, 
3¾ percent, and 17½ percent of fluctuations in GDP growth for Estonia, Latvia and Lithu-
ania, respectively. With the inclusion of oil price growth, Russia’s share of variation rises 
to 47 percent, 20 percent, and 18½ percent for the three countries in the same order.
In contrast with the variance decomposition results of the base VAR model, the fo-
llowing emerge from the extended VAR model. First, the average share of variation to 
Baltic GDP attributable to EU GDP falls. Second, shocks from Russian GDP account for 
a significantly higher proportion of variation to GDP in the Baltic countries. Third, the 
share of variation attributable to REER falls in Estonia and Latvia but rises in the case 
of Lithuania. Finally, variation associated with changes from domestic GDP generally 
falls. One possible explanation for this result is that the share of variation associated with 
shocks from GDP in the base VAR models may also have been capturing supply side ef-
fects, most of which have now been accounted for by the inclusion of oil price growth in 
the extended VAR models.
Introducing oil price growth has the following effects on the impulse response functi-
ons.7 First, oil price shocks have negative effects in all three Baltic countries. Although the 
contemporaneous impact on Lithuania is the highest among the three countries, it makes 
7 For robustness, both VAR models were also estimated using data from 1996:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The results are 
not significantly different and strengthens the stance that the adopted sample (2000:Q1 to 2007:Q4) is best suited to 
shed light on current spillovers in the Baltics.149
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the fastest recovery following the shock as its GDP growth rate rises by about half a per-
centage point in the second quarter and further by almost one percent in the fifth quarter. 
Second, the standard errors of the impulse response functions generally become smaller, 
which suggests an improvement in the precision of the estimates. Third, the responses 
from EU GDP growth remain largely unchanged while shocks from the REER depress 
growth in all three Baltic countries. Finally, the effects of shocks from Russia become si-
gnificant. In particular, shocks from Russia have a negative effect on Estonia and Latvia 
but a positive effect on Lithuania.
Russia’s negative effect on Estonia and Latvia could be mainly related to the supply-
side distortions that oil prices may introduce into the economies of oil-importing coun-
tries like Estonia and Latvia. In particular, an increase in the international price of oil is 
likely to lead to a faster pace of economic activity in Russia while conversely having an 
adverse effect on the oil-importing Baltic countries.
5 Measuring the channels of spillovers
The relative importance of potential channels of spillovers to the Baltics is examined 
in this section, following the procedure of Bayoumi and Swiston (2007). This consists 
of augmenting our original VAR model by introducing variables that proxy for these po-
tential channels of spillovers as exogenous variables in a separate VAR. The difference 
between the response of GDP in the base and augmented VAR is interpreted as the size of 
the spillover attributable to that particular channel. For example, the difference between 
the response of a Baltic country to Russian growth in the base VAR and the augmented 
VAR with financial conditions equals the impact of financial spillovers between the two 
countries. This difference is interpreted as the share of spillovers from Russia that is tran-
smitted through financial linkages. Thus, the contribution of a given channel to spillo-
vers can be given as:
 K i, j = IRi – IRi, j  (1)
where Ki, j is the contribution of a particular channel to spillovers, IRi is the impulse res-
ponses from the base VAR while IRi, j is the responses from augmented VAR in which a 
given channel, j, is introduced as an exogenous variable, rather than as an additional equ-
ation in the VAR. Since the estimation of channels of spillovers are carried out using this 
separate methodology, the sum of the contributions is not constrained to reflect the esti-
mates of total spillovers from the base VAR. Rather, our goal is to measure the relative 
importance and contribution of each potential source of spillovers.
The analysis considered three potential sources of spillovers, namely, trade, financial 
conditions, and commodity prices. Spillovers from trade were captured by the contribu-
tion of net exports to real GDP growth as it reflects the contemporaneous interaction of a 
given country with foreign demand, and is likely to be exogenous to domestic conditions. 
For financial channels, we used equity prices in EU countries. The non-energy component 
of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index and the average petroleum spot price (APSP) 
of oil were used to capture commodity prices. These commodity prices were converted 
into real terms using the US GDP deflator because they are expressed in US dollars. To 150
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allow for transmission lags, both their contemporaneous and lagged values were introdu-
ced into the VAR in quarterly percent changes.
In terms of spillovers from major trading partners, financial conditions and trade lin-
kages are the most important channels of spillovers to Latvia and Lithuania (Table 2). Jo-
intly, these channels account for the transmission of over 75 percent of spillovers to La-
tvia and Lithuania, with commodity prices contributing an average of 19 percent in Latvia 
and 25 percent in Lithuania. This result is quite plausible since the Baltic countries have 
contiguous borders with most of their major trading partners. In the case of financial cha-
nnels, the result also conforms to a priori expectations, given that over 80 percent of ban-
king sector assets in the Baltics belongs to foreign-owned banks. Klyuev (2008) argues 
that financial conditions matter more than trade with regard to spillovers from the U.S. to 
Canada while Osterholm and Zettelmeyer (2007) finds that financial conditions are more 
important than commodity prices in transmitting spillovers from the U.S. to Mexico. 
Table 2:   Contribution to overall spillovers in the Baltic countries (in %)
Finance Trade Comm-prices
Estonia
EU-15 23.4 25.6 51.0
Russia 23.0 29.8 47.2
Latvia
EU-15 36.8 41.7 21.4
Russia 26.4 58.1 15.5
Lithuania
EU-15 31.9 39.7 28.4
Russia 37.5 41.3 21.2
Source: Author’s calculations.
In Estonia, commodity prices account for the largest share of transmission of spillo-
vers from major trading partners. On average, they account for nearly half of spillovers 
from the EU and Russia, with financial conditions and trade linkages contributing the re-
mainder. The effect of commodity prices also seems to depend on the structure of trade 
in each country. As Bayoumi and Swiston (2007) argue, global commodity price shocks 
are likely to be dominated by oil prices. Therefore, their impact on GDP growth may be 
negative for net importers of commodities like Estonia. 
However, financial linkages are clearly the most dominant transmission channel of 
spillovers from the Scandinavian region8 (Table 3).9 On average, financial conditions acco-
unt for the transmission of about 45 percent of spillovers from the Scandinavian region to 
8 The Scandinavian region comprises Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
9 The impulse response functions of the Baltics from a one percent shock from the region were similar to those 
from the EU. The results are presented in Figure A4.151
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the Baltics. This result coincides with the percentage of the country’s banking system that 
is foreign-owned. In Estonia, nearly 100 percent of banks are foreign-owned; indeed, 75 
percent of banking sector assets belongs to only two Swedish banks. By contrast, 56 per-
cent and 92 percent of banks are foreign-owned in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively.
Table 3:   Contribution to overall spillovers in the Baltics from the Scandinavian region 
(in %)
Finance Trade Comm-prices
Estonia 51.9 20.7 27.4
Latvia 40.1 31.6 28.3
Lithuania 42.6 29.4 28.0
Source: Author’s calculations.
6 Model predictions and the global crisis
Since the outset of the global crisis, whose signs became clearly visible in early 2008, 
real GDP growth has plummeted in the Baltic countries. Over the period 2008-2009, 
average real GDP declined by 8¾ percent, 10½ percent, and 6¼ percent in Estonia, La-
tvia, and Lithuania, respectively. Over the same period, real GDP declined by 1½ per-
cent, 2¼ percent, and 1¾ percent in the EU, Russia and the Scandinavian region, respec-
tively. However, ex ante forecasts from our VAR estimates suggest that over the period 
2008-2009, real GDP would decline by 8 percent, 12¼ percent and 8½ percent in Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively. The difference between our model’s predictions 
and actual developments over the past two years may be due to the relatively large stan-
dard errors of the VAR estimates, possibly reflecting the short sample size of the time se-
ries adopted for the study. 
7 Conclusions and lessons for policy
This paper sought to examine growth spillovers to the Baltic countries in the con-
text of shifting trade patterns. Supplementing a discussion of trade and financial linka-
ges between the Baltic countries and their major trading partners, vector autoregression 
models were used to estimate the magnitude of spillovers from these partners and from 
shocks to the real effective exchange rate. We have also evaluated the relative importan-
ce of potential channels of spillovers by decomposing our estimated spillovers into com-
modity prices, financial conditions and trade linkages. 
The following conclusions emanate from our results. There are significant cross-co-
untry spillovers to the Baltic countries from their major trading partners, namely, the EU 
countries and Russia. However, both versions of our VAR models suggest that spillovers 
from the EU to the Baltics may be greater than those from Russia, especially in the con-
text of the changes in trade shares between the two major trade partners. Shocks from 
trading partners explain a significant share of variation in Estonian and Lithuanian GDP 152
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growth but less so for Latvia. While financial conditions and trade linkages are the most 
important transmission channels of spillovers in Latvia and Lithuania, commodity price 
channels transmit the largest share of spillovers to Estonia. The paper also shows that the 
effects of shocks from the Scandinavian region resemble those of the EU but financial 
linkages are the dominant channels of transmission of shocks from the region. Adverse 
shocks to the REER generally depress growth in the Baltics, with its most significant ef-
fect on Estonia. 
Several policy implications arise from these results. Against the backdrop of our fin-
ding that financial linkages and trade are important channels of spillovers to the Baltics, 
there are significant downside risks for growth in the Baltic countries following the glo-
bal slowdown. In light of the significant effects of REER shocks on the Baltics, policy 
attention would be necessary to forestall a loss of competitiveness through rising wages 
or high inflation. And given that our results suggest that REER shocks rise over time, 
changes in Baltic competitiveness may continue to impinge on growth more lastingly 
than anticipated. 153
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Table A1:   Results of Unit Root Tests using the Ng-Perron Procedure*
Test statistics 1/ Critical values
1 percent level 5 percent level 10 percent level
Estonia Real GDP
MZa -20.07*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -3.17*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.16*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 1.23*** 1.78 3.17 4.45
Latvia Real GDP
MZa -70.67*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -5.91*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.08*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 1.46*** 1.78 3.17 4.45
Lithuania Real GDP
MZa -13.26*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -2.56*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.19*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 1.91*** 1.78 3.17 4.45
EU-15 Real GDP
MZa -11.12*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -2.35*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.21*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 2.22*** 1.78 3.17 4.45
Russia Real GDP
MZa -44.81*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -4.73*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.11*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 2.04*** 1.78 3.17 4.45
Estonia REER 
MZa -15.71*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -2.72*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.17*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 6.27*** 1.78 3.17 4.45
Latvia REER        
MZa -26.23*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -3.55*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.14*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 3.92*  1.78 3.17 4.45
Lithuania REER
MZa -31.62*** -13.80 -8.10 -5.70
MZt -3.97*** -2.58 -1.98 -1.62
MSB 0.13*** 0.17 0.23 0.28
MPT 2.90**    1.78 3.17 4.45
1/*, **, and *** represent rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
Note: MZa, MZt, MSB, and MPT are modified versions of the Philips-Perron (1988) Z-tests, which 
suffer from severe size distortions when the error term has a negative moving-average root. These “modi-
fied Z-tests” corrects for the shortcoming of the Z-tests.
Source: Author’s calculations.154
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Table A2:   Variance decomposition for Baltic countries’ real GDP 
(in %, base VAR models)
Horizon
(Quarters)
EU-15 
GDP
Russia 
GDP
Estonia 
GDP
REER 
(ULC-based)
1 40.1 0.0 41.9 18.0
2 34.0 4.7 29.7 31.7
3 28.7 8.3 28.4 34.6
4 24.4 7.5 30.7 37.4
5 23.1 10.7 28.6 37.6
6 24.5 11.8 27.6 36.1
7 25.8 11.6 27.5 35.1
8 26.0 11.0 30.0 33.1
9 25.8 10.7 30.3 33.2
10 25.7 11.1 30.1 33.1
11 26.1 11.1 29.9 32.9
12 26.9 11.2 30.1 31.8
Horizon
(Quarters)
EU-15 
GDP
Russia 
GDP
Latvia 
GDP
REER
(ULC-based)
1 4.8 0.2 90.0 5.0
2 12.4 2.7 81.4 3.6
3 11.2 4.8 70.7 13.3
4 9.1 4.5 59.6 26.8
5 7.9 3.9 52.0 36.1
6 6.9 3.8 45.6 43.6
7 6.5 3.7 44.8 45.0
8 6.3 3.5 45.6 44.5
9 6.2 3.7 46.5 43.7
10 6.1 4.1 46.4 43.3
11 6.3 4.5 46.1 43.1
12 6.4 4.8 45.7 43.1
Horizon
(Quarters)
EU-15 
GDP
Russia 
GDP
Lithuania 
GDP
REER
(ULC-based)
1 9.9 12.7 75.5 1.9
2 18.8 14.6 64.6 2.0
3 26.3 18.1 53.5 2.0
4 25.1 17.4 53.8 3.7
5 32.4 15.4 47.4 4.8
6 31.7 17.2 46.2 5.0
7 31.2 19.3 44.5 5.1
8 30.9 19.1 43.9 6.1
9 31.9 18.7 43.4 6.0
10 32.3 18.6 43.2 5.9
11 32.1 18.7 43.3 5.9
12 32.1 18.8 43.2 5.9
Source: Author’s calculations.155
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Figure A1:   Baltic countries: GDP growth responses to one percent shocks from major 
trading partners and real effective exchange rate 1/
1/ A shock to the real effective exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation.
Note: The vertical axis is measured in percent while the horizontal axis represents quarters of a 
3-year time horizon.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table A3:   Variance decomposition for Baltic countries’ real GDP (in %, extended VAR 
models)
Horizon
(Quarters)
Oil price
growth
EU-15 
GDP
Russia 
GDP
Estonia 
GDP
REER
(ULC-based)
1 25.4 41.3 17.2 13.8 2.3
2 13.2 24.4 53.9 6.9 1.7
3 10.2 15.0 66.3 3.6 4.8
4 6.6 11.0 66.6 3.1 12.7
5 13.9 6.8 56.9 3.5 19.0
6 17.3 5.6 50.0 4.5 22.6
7 22.8 5.4 44.8 4.3 22.6
8 26.2 6.0 41.0 4.3 22.5
9 26.0 7.1 40.3 4.2 22.3
10 25.6 7.7 40.5 4.2 22.0
11 24.8 8.3 41.0 4.3 21.7
12 24.5 7.6 42.1 4.1 21.7
Horizon
(Quarters)
Oil price
growth
EU-15 
GDP
Russia 
GDP
Latvia 
GDP
REER
(ULC-based)
1 20.5 0.8 2.9 66.1 9.5
2 17.3 4.8 6.5 63.5 8.0
3 13.9 6.5 17.3 51.7 10.6
4 11.6 7.8 24.1 42.5 14.0
5 11.1 9.0 26.4 36.7 16.8
6 17.0 7.7 25.1 31.2 19.0
7 19.3 7.1 23.6 29.8 20.2
8 19.3 6.8 22.7 29.7 21.5
9 18.9 7.0 22.6 29.5 22.1
10 19.9 7.4 22.3 28.8 21.6
11 21.9 7.1 21.5 28.0 21.5
12 23.7 6.7 19.9 26.7 22.9
Horizon
(Quarters)
Oil price
growth
EU-15 
GDP
Russia 
GDP
Lithuania 
GDP
REER
(ULC-based)
1 24.3 0.5 22.1 44.2 8.9
2 20.2 16.6 18.5 36.9 7.8
3 23.7 15.6 25.4 29.4 5.9
4 22.9 15.8 24.7 30.6 5.9
5 20.3 27.4 19.9 23.5 8.9
6 20.5 27.2 19.9 23.5 8.9
7 22.0 26.3 19.1 22.8 9.8
8 25.9 24.5 17.0 20.6 12.0
9 34.1 23.5 14.7 17.5 10.2
10 44.3 20.1 12.1 14.9 8.7
11 47.2 18.5 12.4 13.7 8.3
12 45.4 19.2 14.5 13.1 7.8
Source: Author’s calculations.157
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Figure A2:   Baltic countries: GDP growth responses to one percent shocks from major 
trading partners, oil price growth and REER 1/
1/ A shock to the real effective exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation.
Note: The vertical axis is measured in percent while the horizontal axis represents quarters of a 
3-year time horizon.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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